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INTRODUCTION

In a just regime, one that celebrates individuals as authors of
their own lives, one’s gender identity should be the deciding factor
1
in determining one’s legal sex.
The year 2013 was a big one for the LGBT community. Amid
much fanfare, the United States Supreme Court knocked down the
2
Defense of Marriage Act and effectively did the same to
3
California’s Proposition 8 ban on same-sex marriage. Betty
Crocker donated custom cakes for the first same-sex marriages in
4
5
6
7
8
Minnesota. Maryland, Rhode Island, Delaware, and New Jersey
also joined the ranks of states that have legalized same-sex
marriage. A six-year-old transgender student in Colorado returned
to school without having to worry about what restroom she would
9
use. And of course, Batwoman is engaged to marry her longtime
10
girlfriend.
But like any and every year before it, 2013 was also a year of
injustice and heartbreak. High school sophomore Jadin Bell hung
11
himself after being bullied for being openly gay. Mark Carson was

1. Paisley Currah, The Transgender Rights Imaginary, 4 GEO. J. GENDER &
L. 705, 714 (2003).
2. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
3. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
4. Sasha Aslanian, Betty Crocker Bakes Cakes for State’s First Same-Sex Weddings,
MINN. PUB. RADIO (July 29, 2013), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web
/2013/07/29/news/general-mills-cake-same-sex-wedding.
5. See Civil Marriage Protection Act, ch. 2, 2012 Md. Laws 9.
6. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-1-1 (West, Westlaw through ch. 534 of the
2013 Reg. Sess.).
7. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (West, Westlaw through 79 Laws 2014).
8. See Garden State Equal. v. Dow, 82 A.3d 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2013); Kate
Zernike & Marc Santora, Judge Orders Gay Marriage in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 28, 2013, at A1, available at 2013 WLNR 24295971.
9. See infra Part III.B.
10. See Kevin Melrose, “Batwoman” #17 Puts Marriage Equality in the
Spotlight, COMIC BOOK RESOURCES (Feb. 20, 2013, 7:33 AM), http://www
.comicbookresources.com/?page=article&id=43851. Unfortunately, however, the
superhero will not actually get to marry her ladylove. See Andrew Belonsky,
DC Won’t Let Lesbian Batwoman Get Married, Say Writers, OUT MAG. (Sept. 5,
2013), http://www.out.com/entertainment/popnography/2013/09/05/dc-wont
-let-lesbian-batwoman-get-married-say-writers.
11. Bullied Gay Teen Jadin Bell Dies at OHSU, KATU (Feb. 4, 2013), http://
www.katu.com/news/local/Bullied-gay-teen-Jadin-Bell-dies-at-OHSU-189666081
.html.
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shot and killed while walking with his boyfriend after the gunman
12
assailed him with homophobic hate speech. Twenty-one-year-old
13
Islan Nettles became another casualty of violent transphobia after
14
being beaten to death outside of an NYPD precinct. As of August
2013, the growing number of anti-gay hate crimes in New York City
15
was on track to double the number of reported attacks in 2012.
And in Maine, transgender teen Nicole Maines waited for the
decision of the state’s highest court, hoping that the justices would
recognize her right to attend school without being bullied by peers
16
or administrators.
While all members of the LGBT community face heightened
risk of discrimination, violence, and death, transgender individuals
17
18
are among those most at risk. Anti-LGBTQH murders increased
12. Police: Gunman Used Anti-Gay Slurs Before Killing Man in Greenwich Village,
CBS N.Y. (May 18, 2013, 10:30 PM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2013/05/18
/man-shot-killed-at-busy-greenwich-village-intersection.
13. Transphobia takes many forms as a means of expressing fear, loathing,
and discrimination towards people whose identity or gender presentation (or
perceived gender or gender identity) does not ‘match’ the sex they were assigned
at birth. It is based around the idea that there are only two sexes, and that people
who fit gender stereotypes (by sounding, looking, or behaving like men and
women are ‘supposed to’) are somehow better than those who don’t. Trans*
people, gender queer people, and individuals with a transsexual history may also
experience homophobia, because the abuser often neither knows nor cares how a
person identifies, just that they are different in some way. See Eric Grollman,
What Is Transphobia? And, What Is Cissexism?, KINSEYCONFIDENTIAL (Jan. 24,
2012), http://kinseyconfidential.org/transphobia. See generally QUESTIONING
TRANSPHOBIA, http://www.questioningtransphobia.com (last visited Apr. 14,
2014).
14. Call for Action in Wake of Transgender Woman’s Beating Death, CBS N.Y.
(Aug. 27, 2013, 10:34 PM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2013/08/27/call-for
-action-in-wake-of-transgender-womans-beating-death.
15. Anti-Gay Hate Crimes Set to Double in New York City in 2013, RUPTLY
(Aug. 19, 2013, 10:37 PM), http://rt.com/usa/anti-gay-crimes-double-691.
16. See infra Part III.C.
17. See, e.g., Emilia L. Lombardi et al., Gender Violence: Transgender Experiences
with Violence and Discrimination, 42 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 89 (2002); Rebecca L.
Stotzer, Violence Against Transgender People: A Review of United States Data,
14 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 170 (2009).
18. For consistency’s sake, I will use the acronym LGBT throughout this note
to refer to the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender community with the
understanding that transgender encompasses “anyone whose identity or behavior
falls outside of stereotypical gender norms.” See infra Part II.A.3. The National
Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs report, however, refers to members of the
“lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and HIV-affected (LGBTQH)
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from twenty-seven in 2010 to thirty in 2011, an eleven percent
increase—the highest number of murders ever recorded by the
19
National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs. Forty percent of all
hate violence murder victims in 2011 were transgender women,
while representing only ten percent of overall hate violence
20
survivors. The 2011 study found that transgender people were
1.76 times as likely to require medical attention as compared to
overall survivors of hate violence, and were 1.67 times as likely to
21
experience police violence. Additionally, transgender people of
color were 2.38 times as likely to experience police violence and
22
1.85 times as likely to experience discrimination. A combined
study from the National Center for Transgender Equality and the
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force suggests that a staggering
23
forty-one percent of trans* people have attempted suicide,
24
compared to 1.6 percent of the general population. The study

communities,” which is largely overlapping but not necessarily identical. See infra
note 19.
19. NAT’L COAL. OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, HATE VIOLENCE AGAINST
LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, QUEER AND HIV-AFFECTED COMMUNITIES IN
THE U.S. IN 2011, at 9 (2012).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. In recent years, the term “trans*” (with an asterisk) has seen rising
popularity. As explained by activist and author Sam Killermann:
Trans* is an umbrella term that refers to all of the identities within
the gender identity spectrum. There’s a ton of diversity there, but we
often group them all together . . . . Trans (without the asterisk) is best
applied to trans men and trans women, while the asterisk makes special
note in an effort to include all non-cisgender gender identities,
including transgender, transsexual, transvestite, genderqueer,
genderfluid, non-binary, genderfuck, genderless, agender, nongendered, third gender, two-spirit, bigender, and trans man and trans
woman.
The origin behind the asterisk, as I understand it, is a bit computer
geeky. When you add an asterisk to the end of a search term, you’re
telling your computer to search for whatever you typed, plus any
characters after (e.g., [search term*][extra letters], or trans*[-gender,
-queer, -sexual, etc.]). The idea was to include trans and other
identities related to trans, in the most technically awesome way.
Sam Killermann, What Does the Asterisk in Trans* Stand For?, IT’S PRONOUNCED
METROSEXUAL,
http://itspronouncedmetrosexual.com/2012/05/what-does-the
-asterisk-in-trans-stand-for (last visited Mar. 13, 2014).
24. JAIME M. Grant ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. & NAT’L GAY
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found that trans* individuals are consistently abused, discriminated
against (in areas of employment, housing, police interactions, and
25
health care, among others), harassed, and assaulted. Many trans*
individuals live in extreme poverty and are almost four times more
likely than heterosexual and LGB-identified people to have a
26
household income of less than $10,000 per year. Individuals who
“expressed a transgender identity or gender non-conformity while
in grades K–12 reported alarming rates of harassment (78%),
physical assault (35%), and sexual violence (12%); harassment was
so severe that it led almost one-sixth (15%) to leave a school in K–
27
12 settings or in higher education.”
Transgender individuals have to fight for equal protection and
treatment in numerous and varied areas. This Note focuses on one
28
facet of harm caused to gender nonconforming students in the K–
12 setting by examining the right of transgender students in public
schools to use restrooms that correspond with their gender identity
rather than their biological sex. Part II of this Note provides an
introduction to transgender terminology and gives an overview of
transgender jurisprudence in the United States by discussing two
key transgender cases, one in the Seventh Circuit and one decided
by the Minnesota Supreme Court. Part III addresses the specific
issues related to restrooms in public schools, and examines two
recent rulings on the subject: a 2013 decision from the Colorado
& LESBIAN TASK FORCE, INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 2 (2011). With over 6000 respondents, the
National Transgender Discrimination Survey is the largest survey of transgender
and gender nonconforming adults to date. In January 2014, the Williams Institute
and the American Foundation for Suicide Prevention released a new report
analyzing the data reported in the Survey, seeking to increase understanding of
the disproportionately high numbers and identifying key characteristics and
experiences associated with lifetime suicide attempts in the Survey sample as a
whole. See ANN P. HAAS ET AL., AM. FOUND. FOR SUICIDE PREVENTION & WILLIAMS
INST., SUICIDE ATTEMPTS AMONG TRANSGENDER AND GENDER NON-CONFORMING
ADULTS: FINDINGS OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY (2014).
25. GRANT ET AL., supra note 24, at 2–8.
26. Id. at 2.
27. Id. at 3.
28. While recognizing that there are psychological, medical, and/or
sociological differences in the ways that the following terms are assigned, used,
and assumed, for the purposes of this note the terms “transgender,” “trans*,”
“gender-variant,” and “gender nonconforming” are meant to include the widest
possible range of people who do not fit into traditional social gender norms. See
infra Part II.A.3.
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Civil Rights Division and a 2014 decision from the Maine Supreme
Court. Finally, Part IV recognizes the important role that schools
play in the well-being of transgender youth and considers
nondiscriminatory policies implemented by individual schools
nationwide, as well as solutions offered on the national and state
levels.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

What is Transgender?
1.

Terminology: “Sex” versus “Gender”

In everyday language, the terms “gender” and “sex” are often
29
used interchangeably. In actuality, the terms have different and
unique meanings, and the distinction between the two is a crucial
one. “Sex” refers to a person’s biological or anatomical identity as
30
(most often) male or female, while “gender” is the “complex
interrelationship between [physical] traits and one’s internal sense
of self as male, female, both or neither[—gender identity—]as well
as one’s outward presentations and behaviors related to that
31
perception[—gender expression].” In other words, gender can be
thought of as a socially constructed system of classification used to
refer to the “cultural or attitudinal qualities that are characteristic
32
of a particular sex” (i.e., qualities that are categorized as being
29. Jamison Green, Introduction to PAISLEY CURRAH & SHANNON MINTER, THE
POLICY INST. OF THE NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE & THE NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN
RIGHTS, TRANSGENDER EQUALITY 1, 2 (2000), available at http://www.thetaskforce
.org/downloads/reports/reports/TransgenderEquality.pdf.
30. See Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the
Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 271–74 (1999).
The assumption is that there are two separate roads, one leading
from XY chromosomes at conception to manhood, the other from XX
chromosomes from conception to womanhood. The fact is that that
there are not two roads, but one road with a number of forks that turn
in the male or female direction. Most of us turn in the same direction
at each fork. The bodies of millions of intersexed people have taken a
combination of male and female forks and followed the road less
traveled.
Id. at 278.
31. Understanding Gender, GENDER SPECTRUM, https://www.genderspectrum
.org/understanding-gender (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
32. Greenberg, supra note 30, at 274.
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masculine or feminine), while sex is determined by a combination
of physical attributes including chromosomes, hormones, and
33
external genitalia, among other factors. A “traditional” view links
sex and gender rigidly together; a trans* identity can only begin to
be understood with the acknowledgement that things are more
complicated than that and that there is no compulsory link
34
between the two.
It is not only in everyday use that the terms sex and gender
have been conflated; they have frequently been used
interchangeably by courts, legislatures, and administrative
35
agencies. Given the prevalence of regulations and statutes that
differentiate between individuals based upon their sex or gender,
36
one might assume that these terms have clear legal meanings.
33. See id. at 278 (discussing the eight or more factors that contribute to the
determination of an individual’s sex); see also Understanding Gender, supra note 31.
34. For an entertaining video explanation of the terms, see Vlogbrothers,
Human Sexuality Is Complicated, YOUTUBE (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=xXAoG8vAyzI (discussing sex, gender, sexual orientation, and sexual
behavior).
35. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239–41 (1989)
(using “sex” and “gender” interchangeably); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312,
1315 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that in the Equal Protection context, the Supreme
Court uses the words “sex” and “gender” “interchangeably”); Rene v. MGM Grand
Hotel, Inc., 243 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he term ‘sex’ refers to
gender. In the context of Title VII these terms are used interchangeably.”);
Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that the Gender
Motivated Violence Act and Title VII “prohibit discrimination based on gender as
well as sex. Indeed, for purposes of these two acts, the terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender’
have become interchangeable.”); Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 148
(3d Cir. 1999) (noting that the terms “sex” and “gender” are used interchangeably
in employment discrimination cases and are not considered to be distinct
concepts for Title VII purposes).
Because Congress intended that the term “sex” in Title VII mean
simply “man” or “woman,” there is no need to distinguish between the
terms “sex” and “gender” in Title VII cases. . . . Some academic writers,
however, seek to maintain or to heighten a distinction between the
terms “sex” and “gender,” asserting that “gender” connotes cultural or
attitudinal characteristics distinctive to the sexes, as opposed to their
physical characteristics. While it may be useful to disaggregate the
definition of “gender” from “sex” for some purposes, in this opinion
we make no such effort, using the terms interchangeably to refer to
whether an employee is a man or a woman.
Hopkins v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 749 n.1 (4th Cir. 1996) (citations
omitted).
36. Greenberg, supra note 30, at 270.
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Unfortunately, the law defines these terms inconsistently at best, or
37
worse, fails to define them at all. The difficulties presented by this
lack of legal definition are easily seen in the widely varying
outcomes of cases that grapple with issues of gender and sexuality,
not only in the outcomes of different cases, but in the inconsistent
rulings in the same case as it moves through the judiciary from
38
lower to appellate courts.
2.

39

Trans* as a Medical Identity

May of 2013 saw the publication of the fifth edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, in which the
40
diagnosis of gender identity disorder was replaced with gender

37. Id.
38. Currah, supra note 1, at 711. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg may be partially to blame for the interchangeable use of the words sex
and gender in the law. Professor Mary Anne Case relates the following anecdote:
[Justice Ginsburg] explained that a secretary once told her, “I’m typing
all these briefs and articles for you and the word sex, sex, sex, is on
every page. Don’t you know those nine men [on the Supreme Court],
they hear that word and their first association is not the way you want
them to be thinking? Why don’t you use the word gender? It is a
grammatical term and it will ward off distracting associations.”
Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 10 (1995).
39. For a detailed account of the history of transsexuality as a medical
phenomenon, see JOANNE MEYEROWITZ, HOW SEX CHANGED: A HISTORY OF
TRANSSEXUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES (2004).
40. As explained by the fourth edition of the DSM:
There are two components of Gender Identity Disorder, both of which
must be present to make the diagnosis. There must be evidence of a
strong and persistent cross-gender identification, which is the desire to
be, or the insistence that one is, of the other sex (Criterion A). This
cross-gender identification must not merely be a desire for any
perceived cultural advantages of being the other sex. There must also
be evidence of persistent discomfort about one’s assigned sex or a
sense of inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex (Criterion B).
The diagnosis is not made if the individual has a concurrent physical
intersex condition . . . (Criterion C). To make the diagnosis, there
must be evidence of clinically significant distress or impairment in
social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning
(Criterion D).
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTIC MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
576 (4th ed. 1994).
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41

dysphoria. The term “gender dysphoria” was popularized by
Norman Fisk in the early 1970s as a diagnostic term used in
evaluating individuals who “were intensely and abidingly
uncomfortable in their anatomic and genetic sex and their
42
assigned gender.” The way in which transgenderism is defined
medically has significant impact in the courts. The Supreme Court
relied on the American Medical Association and the American
Psychiatric Association and adopted the gender identity disorder
framework in defining a transsexual as “one who has ‘[a] rare
psychiatric disorder in which a person feels persistently
uncomfortable about his or her anatomical sex,’ and who typically
seeks medical treatment, including hormonal therapy and surgery,
43
to bring about a permanent sex change.”
From a legal perspective, the classification of gender dysphoria
as a diagnosable condition is extremely harmful to some trans*
people but surprisingly beneficial to others. Having a gender
dysphoria diagnosis can serve as the basis for an argument that a
transgender parent is mentally ill and so should not receive custody
of his or her child, but it can also be a diagnosis that justifies
41. See Gender Dysphoria, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (2013), http://www.dsm5.org
/Documents/Gender%20Dysphoria%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf (explaining the revisions as intended to decrease associated stigma while “offering a diagnostic name
that is more appropriate to the symptoms and behaviors . . . experience[d]
without jeopardizing . . . access to effective treatment options.”); see also AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTIC MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 451–
59 (5th ed. 2013) (“Gender dysphoria refers to the distress that may accompany
the incongruence between one’s experienced or expressed gender and one’s
assigned gender . . . . The current term is more descriptive than the previous DSMIV term gender identity disorder and focuses on dysphoria as the clinical problem,
not identity per se.”).
42. Norman Fisk, Gender Dysphoria Syndrome (The How, What and Why of a
Disease), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND INTERDISCIPLINARY SYMPOSIUM ON GENDER
DYSPHORIA SYNDROME 7, 10 (Donald R. Laub & Patrick Gandy eds., 1973).
43. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994) (quoting AM. MED. ASS’N,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 1006 (1989)). The Supreme Court is far from the only
authority to rely on an individual’s desire for “medical treatment” as an indicator
of his or her transsexuality. See, e.g., Susan Etta Keller, Operations of Legal Rhetoric:
Examining Transsexual and Judicial Identity, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329, 329
(1999) (“A transsexual is someone who undergoes or contemplates undergoing
anatomical and hormonal modifications in order to live in and be recognized as a
different gender than the one attributed at birth.”). Contra Definition of Terms,
GEND. EQUITY RES. CTR., http://geneq.berkeley.edu/lgbt_resources_definiton_of
_terms#transsexual (last visited Mar. 13, 2014) (“Not all transsexuals can have or
desire surgery.”).
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insurance coverage for gender reassignment surgery and other
44
medical procedures that sometimes accompany a transition.
Importantly, and most relevant to this Note, modern medical
practice counsels that an individual’s sex for purposes of accessing
segregated facilities should be determined by that individual’s
45
gender identity.
3.

The Transgender Umbrella

While many transsexual individuals may identify as
transgender, “transgender” is a broader, more encompassing term,
often used without the medical and psychiatric diagnoses
46
associated with the term transsexual. Rather,
[i]n contemporary usage, transgender has become an
“umbrella” term that is used to describe a wide range of
identities and experiences, including but not limited to:
pre-operative, post-operative, and non-operative transsexual people; male and female cross-dressers (sometimes
referred to as “transvestites,” “drag queens” or “drag
kings”); intersexed individuals; and men and women,
regardless of sexual orientation, whose appear-ance or
47
characteristics are perceived to be gender atypical.

44. See Camille Beredjick, DSM-V to Rename Gender Identity Disorder
‘Gender Dysphoria’, ADVOCATE (July 23, 2012, 8:00 PM), http://www.advocate.com
/politics/transgender/2012/07/23/dsm-replaces-gender-identity-disorder-gender
-dysphoria. For a review of the critique of the medical model in transgender rights
litigation, see Susan Etta Keller, Crisis of Authority: Medical Rhetoric and Transsexual
Identity, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51 (1999).
45. See NAT’L ASS’N OF SOCIAL WORKERS, SOCIAL WORK SPEAKS: NASW POLICY
STATEMENTS 2009–2012, at 346–47 (8th ed. 2009); Clarification on Medical Necessity of
Treatment, Sex Reassignment, and Insurance Coverage in the U.S.A., WORLD PROF’L
ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH 3 (June 17, 2008), http://www.wpath
.org/uploaded_files/140/files/Med%20Nec%20on%202008%20Letterhead.pdf;
Position Statement on Discrimination Against Transgender and Gender Variant
Individuals, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (July 2012), http://www.psychiatry.org/File
%20Library/Advocacy%20and%20Newsroom/Position%20Statements/ps2012
_TransgenderDiscrimination.pdf; Transgender, Gender Identity, & Gender Expression
Non-Discrimination, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (Aug. 2008), http://www.apa.org/about
/policy/transgender.aspx.
46. Green, supra note 29, at 3–4.
47. Id. at 3. There are those, however, who argue that the idea of an
umbrella term comes with its own set of problems. See, e.g., Mercedes Allen, The
Death of the ‘Transgender’ Umbrella, BILERICO PROJECT (June 1, 2011, 8:00 PM),
http://www.bilerico.com/2011/06/the_death_of_transgender.php.
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Although the term “transgender” has been in use since the late
48
1960s, the contemporary understanding of transgender arose in
49
the mid-1990s. “In its broadest sense, transgender encompasses
anyone whose identity or behavior falls outside of stereotypical
50
gender norms.” Other terms that may be used in place of
transgender include “gender variant,” “gender different,” and
51
“gender non-conforming.” The broader spectrum of experience
covered by transgender has allowed many LGB individuals to adopt
the transgender label because it describes their own experience of
living outside the gender binary or, in the instance of transsexual
people, helps describe their ongoing consciousness of gender
transgression, even after they have changed their sex to reflect
their gender identity. In this Note, use of the terms “transgender”
or “trans*,” as well as “gender-variant” and “gender nonconforming,” are meant to include the widest possible range of
people who do not fit into traditional social norms about gender.
B.

Transgender Jurisprudence
1.

Title VII and Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.

Federal courts from the 1970s through the 1990s generally
denied sex-discrimination claims brought by transgender
52
individuals. The precedent for transsexual legal status under the
48. There is considerable debate about the origins of the word
“transgender,” but LGBT scholars generally agree that the word was more or less
commonly in use by the 1970s (albeit with several different meanings). Two
sources that are often cited as the first appearance of the term are psychiatrist
John F. Oliven’s Sexual Hygiene and Pathology (1965) and Virginia Prince’s
article in the December 1969 issue of the magazine Transvestia. For more about
the history of the term and its evolution over the decades, see Richard Ekins &
David King, Remarks at the Eighth International Gender Dysphoria Conference:
Rethinking ‘Who Put the “Trans” in Transgender?’ (2004), published in part in
VIRGINIA PRINCE: PIONEER OF TRANSGENDERING (Richard Ekins & David King eds.,
2006), full transcript available at http://www.gender.org.uk/conf/2004/04ekins
.htm; Cristan Williams, Tracking Transgender: The Historical Truth, EHIPASSIKO,
http://www.cristanwilliams.com/b/tracking-transgender-the-historical-truth (last
visited Apr. 14, 2014); Cristan Williams, The Rise of “Transgender,” BILERICO
PROJECT (July 12, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://www.bilerico.com/2011/07/the_rise_of
_transgender.php.
49. Green, supra note 29, at 3.
50. Id. at 3–4.
51. Id. at 4.
52. See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984)
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Civil Rights Act of 1964 comes from Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc..
The plaintiff was Karen Ulane, who worked as a pilot for Eastern
Airlines from 1968 to 1981 (while living as Kenneth Ulane) and was
54
fired after undergoing sexual reassignment surgery. Ulane
55
brought a charge of sex discrimination under Title VII. Although
the district judge found that Eastern Airlines discharged Ulane
because she was a transsexual and that Title VII prohibited
discrimination on that basis, the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding
56
that “Title VII does not protect transsexuals.”
More recently, however, a number of federal courts, including
the First, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, have held that
transgender or gender nonconforming individuals are protected
57
under federal sex-discrimination laws such as Title VII. In 2012,
(holding that “[t]he words of Title VII do not outlaw discrimination against a
person who has a sexual identity disorder, i.e., . . . a person born with a female
body who believes herself to be male”); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that, where plaintiff claims
discrimination is based on transsexual status rather than sex, such claim is “not
actionable under Title VII and is certainly not in violation of the doctrines of Due
Process and Equal Protection”); James v. Rand Mart Hardware, Inc., 881 F.
Supp. 478, 481 (D. Kan. 1995) (“[Plaintiff] cannot state an actionable claim under
Title VII . . . for employment discrimination based upon transsexualism.”).
53. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
54. Id. at 1082–83.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1084.
57. See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 2011) (“We
conclude that a government agent violates the Equal Protection Clause’s
prohibition of sex-based discrimination when he or she fires a transgender or
transsexual employee because of his or her gender non-conformity.”); Barnes v.
City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 737 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that transsexual
police officer was a member of a protected class for purposes of Title VII claim
because alleged discrimination was based on his “failure to conform to sex
stereotypes”); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding
that transsexual city fire department employee stated a valid sex discrimination
claim under either Title VII or the Equal Protection Clause); Rosa v. Park W. Bank
& Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 216 (1st Cir. 2000) (reinstating Equal Credit
Opportunity claim on behalf of transgender plaintiff who alleged that he was
denied an opportunity to apply for a loan because he was presenting as gender
nonconforming); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that transsexual inmate could state a claim under the Gender Motivated
Violence Act, because ‘“sex’ under Title VII encompasses both sex—that is, the
biological differences between men and women—and gender. Discrimination
because one fails to act in the way expected of a man or woman is forbidden under
Title VII.”); Tronetti v. Healthnet Lakeshore Hosp., No. 03–CV–0375E(SC), 2003
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the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission determined that
discrimination against an employee or applicant on the basis of the
person’s gender identity amounts to sex discrimination in violation
58
of Title VII.
2.

The Restroom Problem: Goins v. West Group

On a fundamental, everyday level, the decision of what
restroom to use is one of the most basic and essential concerns
59
60
facing transgender individuals. While many cisgender individuals
likely have never thought twice about what restroom to walk into,
transgender individuals do not have the luxury of taking that
decision for granted. The right to use the restroom corresponding
to one’s gender identity is one of the most basic aspects of
61
nondiscrimination for a transgender person, as well as one of the
most uncertain and untested areas of law. Until 2014, there had
been only one decision on this issue from a state’s highest court—
62
Goins v. West Group in 2001.
Goins was the Minnesota Supreme Court’s first interpretation
of the Minnesota Human Rights Act as it pertains to the

WL 22757935, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2003) (holding transsexual plaintiff may
state a claim under Title VII “based on the alleged discrimination for failing to ‘act
like a man’”).
58. Macy v. Holder, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *11 (E.E.O.C.
Apr. 20, 2012) (“[W]e conclude that intentional discrimination against a
transgender individual because that person is transgender is, by definition,
discrimination ‘based on . . . sex,’ and such discrimination therefore violates Title
VII.”). For a more in-depth examination of transgender rights and Title VII, see
Ilona M. Turner, Sex Stereotyping Per Se: Transgender Employees and Title VII, 95 CALIF.
L. REV. 561 (2007).
59. STUART BIEGEL, THE RIGHT TO BE OUT: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER
IDENTITY IN AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 190 (2010).
60. A cisgender person is someone who identifies as the gender that
corresponds with that individual’s biological sex or that is affirmed by society (e.g.,
being both male-gendered and male-sexed). See Trans 101: Cisgender, BASIC
RIGHTS ORE. (Oct. 9, 2011), http://www.basicrights.org/uncategorized/trans-101
-cisgender. For a comprehensive discussion of the terms cis-, cissexual, and
cisgender, see Julia Serrano, Whipping Girl FAQ on Cissexual, Cisgender, and Cis
Privilege, LIVEJOURNAL (May 14, 2009, 8:46 AM), http://juliaserano.livejournal
.com/14700.html.
61. NAN D. HUNTER ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS, GAY MEN, BISEXUALS, AND
TRANSGENDER PEOPLE 176 (4th ed. 2004).
62. 635 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 2001).
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prohibition of discrimination against transgender people. The
plaintiff, Julienne Goins, had been designated male at birth, but
had been publicly presenting herself as female since age twenty64
two. Born Justin Goins, she legally changed her name in 1995,
and also had her legal gender changed from genetic male to
65
reassigned female. After transferring from a New York office of
West Group to its facility in Eagan, Minnesota, Goins was informed
that she would be required to use a single-occupancy unisex
restroom, located either on a different floor of the building in
66
67
which she worked or in an entirely different building. Objecting
to the policy, Goins “refrained from eating or drinking during the
68
work day to avoid having to use the women’s restroom,” but at
times she used the women’s restroom located nearest to her
69
workspace. Approximately one month after Goins transferred to
the Eagan office, West’s human resources director warned Goins
that if she continued to use the women’s restroom she would be
70
disciplined. Two months later, Goins resigned and brought an
action against West, alleging that West had discriminated against
71
her by denying her access to the women’s restroom.

63. Despite the disappointing outcome in Goins, Minnesota has a proud
history of being a leader in recognizing the rights of transgender individuals. In
1975, Minneapolis passed the first known statute prohibiting discrimination
against transgender people. CURRAH & MINTER, supra note 29, at 15. Eighteen years
later, with the adoption of an amendment to the Minnesota Human Rights Act to
include gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people, Minnesota became the first
state to enact an antidiscrimination law that includes express protections for
transgender and gender variant people in employment, housing, education, and
public accommodations, as well as providing for enhanced penalties for hate
crimes committed against transgender and gender variant people. See Act of
Apr. 2, 1993, ch. 22, subdiv. 45, 1993 Minn. Laws 121, 122; see also Jenifer M. RossAmato, Transgender Employees & Restroom Designation—Goins v. West Group, Inc.,
29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 569, 570 (2002); Donna Halvorsen, They Know Whereof
They Legislate, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Apr. 2, 1993, at 1B (interviewing Senator
Allan Spear and Representative Karen Clark on the significance of the passage of
the “gay-rights bill”).
64. Ross-Amato, supra note 63, at 571.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 572.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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The Minnesota Supreme Court held that, despite the state’s
antidiscrimination law, Goins’ employer was not prohibited from
requiring a transgender person to alter her biological sex before
being permitted to use the restroom consistent with her gender
72
identity. The court found that West’s restroom policy was not
based on sexual orientation and so was not prohibited by the state’s
73
Human Rights Act. It additionally found that Goins had not met
the burden of showing that she was eligible to use the women’s
74
restroom. In a concurring opinion, Justice Page elaborated that,
“[t]o satisfy this element [of eligibility], Goins must establish that
75
she is biologically female.”

72. Goins v. W. Grp., 635 N.W.2d 717, 723, 725 (Minn. 2001). But see Jones v.
Johnson Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, CP No. 12-11-61830, ¶ 6 (Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n
Mar. 5, 2013) (finding probable cause that denying transgender woman access to
the women’s restroom violated Iowa law). The Iowa Civil Rights Commission has
clarified that Iowa law requires “that individuals are permitted to access . . .
restrooms in accordance with their gender identity, rather than their assigned sex
at birth.” IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N, SEXUAL ORIENTATION & GENDER IDENTITY: A
PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS PROVIDER’S GUIDE TO IOWA LAW (2012). Other civil rights
agencies have issued similar guidance stating that refusing transgender individuals
use of the restroom that matches their gender identity is discrimination under
public accommodations antidiscrimination law. Such jurisdictions include Nevada,
New York, San Francisco, Washington, and the District of Columbia. See, e.g., D.C.
CODE MUN. REGS. tit. 4, § 802 (2006); N.Y.C. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
GUIDELINES REGARDING GENDER IDENTITY DISCRIMINATION 7 (2006), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/cchr/downloads/pdf/publications/GenderDis
_English.pdf; Compliance Guidelines to Prohibit Gender Identity Discrimination, S.F.
HUM. RIGHTS COMM’N (Dec. 10, 2003), http://sf-hrc.org/compliance-guidelinesprohibit-gender-identity-discrimination; Facts About Gender Identity or Expression
Discrimination, NEV. EQUAL RIGHTS COMM’N, http://www.detr.state.nv.us
/nerc_pages/NERC_docs/Facts_About_Gender_Identity_or_Expression_Discrimi
nation.pdf (last visited May 15, 2014); Sexual Orientation/Gender Identity Questions,
WASH. STATE HUM. RIGHTS COMM’N, http://www.hum.wa.gov/faq/FAQSexual
Orientation3.html (last visited May 15, 2014).
73. Goins, 635 N.W.2d at 725–26.
74. Id. at 725.
75. Id. at 726 (emphasis added). Compare this to the standards developed by
the San Francisco Human Rights Commission, which requires businesses and
places of public accommodation to allow persons to use the restroom consistent
with their gender identity so long as they have at least one piece of current
identification that aligns their sex with their gender identity. Compliance Guidelines
to Prohibit Gender Identity Discrimination, supra note 72. Note that this standard
assumes that transsexual persons, regardless of whether they have undergone any
medical treatment, can obtain a driver’s license or other documentation on which
their sex is aligned with their gender identity. See id.
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III. TRANSGENDER YOUTH AND PUBLIC SCHOOL RESTROOMS
The difficulties posed by restrooms are hardly limited to
transgender adults. A survey conducted by the San Francisco
Human Rights Commission found that the lack of safe bathrooms
was among the greatest challenges faced by gender-nonconforming
76
students. Researchers and teachers who work with transgender
and gender-variant children and teens have observed that,
“[r]ather than go to the facility of their assigned gender,
transgender . . . youth frequently simply do not go [to] the
77
bathroom [at all].” For younger children, this can mean
humiliating accidents; for older ones, various health risks, as well as
78
distractedness in school and a greater likelihood of dropping out.
“For the child to use a restroom that does not match affirmed
gender is a very concrete rejection of his/her own reality, a betrayal
79
of who one knows oneself to be.”
A.

California Education Committee, L.L.C. v. O’Connell
80

In California Education Committee, L.L.C. v. O’Connell, anti-gay
organizations Advocates for Faith and Freedom and the Alliance

76. See S.F. HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, GENDER NEUTRAL BATHROOM SURVEY
RESULTS (2002), available at http://archive.srlp.org/files/documents/toolkit/gnb
_survey.pdf.
77. Interview by Stuart Biegel with Joel Baum, Dir. of Educ. & Training,
Gender Spectrum (Aug. 2, 2009), in BIEGEL, supra note 59, at 190; accord JOSEPH G.
KOSCIW ET AL., GAY, LESBIAN & STRAIGHT EDUC. NETWORK, THE 2009 NATIONAL
SCHOOL CLIMATE SURVEY: THE EXPERIENCES OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND
TRANSGENDER YOUTH IN OUR NATION’S SCHOOLS 90 (2010), available at
http://glsen.org/download/file/NDIyMw==; Peer Violence and Bullying Against
Transgender and Gender Nonconforming Youth, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. 4
(May 2011), http://transequality.org/PDFs/US%20Civ%20Rts%20Commn%20
NCTE%20statement%205%206%2011.pdf.
78. Interview with Joel Baum, supra note 77, at 190.
79. Id. at 266 n.50.
80. Minute Order, Cal. Educ. Comm. L.L.C. v. O’Connell, No. 34-200800026507-CU-CR-GDS (Cal. Super. Ct. June 1, 2009). A similar controversy made
headlines four years prior, when a school board in Orange County, California,
risked the loss of millions of dollars in state money rather than adopt a new policy
protecting gender nonconforming youth. The school board’s 3-2 decision made
national headlines, largely due to the outspokenness of the board members who
opposed the adoption of the antidiscrimination policy. One board member is
quoted as saying, “I might take a lot of heat for [the decision] today, but the
rewards are going to be great in heaven.” See Fermin Leal, Board Defying Rules on
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Defense Fund filed a lawsuit challenging Senate Bill 777 (SB 777),
a 2007 legislative act that strengthened California’s hate crimes laws
and antidiscrimination protections for students. Among other
things, SB 777 codified the definition of gender, stating that
‘“[g]ender’ means sex, and includes a person’s gender identity and
gender related appearance and behavior whether or not
81
stereotypically associated with the person’s assigned sex at birth.”
Plaintiffs specifically objected to the bill’s definition of gender,
arguing that the codified definition “recklessly abandon[ed] the
traditional understanding of biological sex in favor of an elusive
definition that is unconstitutionally vague,” and alleged that the
legislation violated non-transgender students’ rights to privacy and
82
safety under the California Constitution. Plaintiffs were especially
concerned that students would be “subjected to extreme
embarrassment, humiliation, anxiety, intimidation, and emotional
distress” if schools permitted transgender students to use gendercorresponding restrooms, even suggesting that such a policy would
create “substantial danger to the physical safety” of school
83
employees and students. In response to the alleged privacy
concerns, Equality California and the Gay-Straight Alliance
Network filed a lengthy amicus brief providing extensive support
for the proposition that “[n]o legally protected privacy interest is
implicated when schools permit transgender students to use
84
gender-segregated facilities consistent with their gender identity.”
Gender, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Mar. 9, 2004), http://www.goldtalk.com/forum
/showthread.php?t=24108; R. Scott Moxley, Gays 1, Phobes 0: The Passion of the
Westminster School Board, ORANGE COUNTY WKLY. (May 6, 2004),
http://www.ocweekly.com/2004-05-06/news/gays-1-phobes-0/; Mason Stockstill,
School Trustees in Westminster Won’t Recognize Transgender Rule, SAN DIEGO UNION
TRIB. (March 30, 2004, 11:56 AM), http://legacy.utsandiego.com/news/state
/20040330-1156-ca-transgenderrights.html.
81. California Student Civil Rights Act, ch. 569, § 4, 2007 Cal. Stat. 4642,
4642–43 (codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE § 210.7 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg.
Sess. laws)).
82. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 2, 10,
Cal. Educ. Comm. L.L.C. v. O’Connell, No. 37-2008-00077546-CU-CRCTL.
83. Id. at 10.
84. [Proposed] Memorandum of Points and Authorities of Amici Curiae
Equality California and Gay-Straight Alliance Network in Support of Defendant’s
Demurrer at 11, Cal. Educ. Comm. L.L.C. v. O’Connell, No. 34-2008-00026507CU-CR-GDS. Similarly, in 2004, a federal district court in Arizona held that a
community college’s policy prohibiting transgender employees from using the
restroom that corresponded with their gender identity bore no rational
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Superior Court Judge Shelleyanne W.L. Chang ruled for the
defendants, finding, among other things, that the pleading was
“inadequate to allege any invasion of privacy” and that allegations
85
of safety contraventions were “conclusory and . . . unsupported.”
In contrast, the safety concerns that transgender individuals
face every day are real, substantial, and well documented, as well as
the “extreme embarrassment, humiliation, anxiety, intimidation,
86
and emotional distress” that accompanies having to routinely
87
assert and defend one’s gender identity. While transgender
individuals get harassed and discriminated against in a variety of
situations, “public restrooms tend to invite extra scrutiny of
people’s appearance based on comparisons to stereotypes about
88
how men and women are supposed to look or act.”
B.

Coy Mathis and the Colorado Civil Rights Determination

In December of 2012, Superintendent Cheryl Serrano received
a letter sent on behalf of Kathryn and Jeremy Mathis, parents of a
first grader enrolled at Eagleside Elementary. The letter, sent by
the Transgender Legal Defense and Education Fund (TLDEF),
relationship to any privacy interest and rejected as baseless the assumption that
“the presence of a biological woman with male genitalia invades the privacy
and/or threatens the safety of other women.” Kastl v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll.
Dist., Civ. No. 02–1531PHX–SRB, 2004 WL 2008954, at *8 (D. Ariz. June 3, 2004).
In Cruzan v. Special School District, No. 1, 294 F.3d 981, 982–83 (8th Cir. 2002),
the Eighth Circuit rejected a claim brought by a Minnesota teacher alleging that
she had been harmed by the school district’s policy allowing a transgendered
coworker to use the women’s faculty restroom. The court held that school’s policy
did not create a hostile work environment. Id. at 984.
85. Minute Order at 3, Cal. Educ. Comm. L.L.C. v. O’Connell, No. 34-200800026507-CU-CR-GDS.
86. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra
note 82, at 10.
87. See, e.g., Grant et al., supra note 24, at 2–9; EMILY A. GREYTAK ET AL., GAY,
LESBIAN & STRAIGHT EDUC. NETWORK, HARSH REALITIES: THE EXPERIENCES OF
TRANSGENDER YOUTH IN OUR NATION’S SCHOOLS 18–23 (2009); NAT’L COAL. OF
ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, supra note 19, at 19–50; Lombardi et al., supra note 17,
at 90–91, 93–100; Stotzer, supra note 17, at 170–177.
88. LAMBDA LEGAL, EQUAL ACCESS TO PUBLIC RESTROOMS 1 (2011) (emphasis
omitted). The prevalence of harassment, discrimination, and violence facing
gender variant individuals using public restrooms has spurred the creation of
resources such as SaferStalls, a nationwide directory and searchable map of
gender-neutral or single-stall bathrooms. SAFERSTALLS, http://saferstalls.github.io
/SaferStalls (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
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addressed the school district’s decision to refuse the Mathises’
89
daughter, Coy, access to the girls’ restrooms at school. Coy was
identified as male at birth, but self-identified as female “as soon as
90
she could express herself,” and had attended school as a girl since
91
December 2011. Additionally, the U.S. government recognizes
Coy as a girl on her U.S. passport, as does the State of Colorado on
92
her state-issued ID. Early in Coy’s kindergarten year, the Mathises
93
met with the school to discuss Coy’s gender variance. School
officials were accepting of Coy’s gender expression, and her early
experiences at Eagleside were positive ones; the school “permitted
Coy to wear girls’ clothing and to be identified and referred to as a
girl in the school environment as soon as [Coy’s] gender identity
94
issue was brought to its attention.” This included allowing Coy to
95
use the girls’ bathroom and stand in girls’ lines; however, in
December 2012, Eagleside Principal Jason Crow informed the
Mathis family that Coy would no longer be permitted to use the
girls’ restrooms, but instead would be required to use the boys’
restrooms, the single-user staff restroom, or the single-user
96
restroom in the health room. When the school district refused to
reconsider its decision, TLDEF filed a complaint with the Colorado
Civil Rights Division, alleging that Coy had been discriminated
97
against in violation of the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act.

89. Letter from Michael D. Silverman, Exec. Dir., Transgender Legal Def. &
Educ. Fund, to Cheryl Serrano, Superintendent of Sch., Fountain-Fort Carson
Sch. Dist. No. 8 (Dec. 26, 2012) [hereinafter TLDEF Letter], http://www
.transgenderlegal.org/media/uploads/doc_490.pdf.
90. Siera Santos, Transgender First-Grader’s Bathroom Use Spurs School
Discrimination Complaint, KOAA (Feb. 27, 2013, 8:18 PM), http://www.koaa
.com/news/transgender-first-grader-s-bathroom-use-spurs-school-discrimination
-complaint.
91. TLDEF Letter, supra note 89.
92. Rebuttal Statement in Response to Fountain-Fort Carson School
District’s Position Statement at 3, Mathis v. Fountain-Fort Carson Sch. Dist. No. 8,
No. P20130034X (Colo. Civ. Rights Div. 2013) [hereinafter TLDEF Rebuttal
Statement].
93. Santos, supra note 90.
94. TLDEF Rebuttal Statement, supra note 92, at 1.
95. Santos, supra note 90.
96. TLDEF Letter, supra note 89.
97. Determination at 1, Mathis v. Fountain-Fort Carson Sch. Dist. No. 8,
No. P20130034X,
Determination].
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The Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) prohibits
schools from discriminating against transgender students.
Specifically, CADA states:
It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for a person,
directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from, or deny
to an individual or a group, because of disability, . . .
sex, [or] sexual orientation, . . . the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of a place of public
98
accommodation . . . .
CADA defines “public accommodation” to include “an educational
99
100
institution,” such as Eagleside, and defines “sexual orientation”
101
to include “transgender status.” Colorado regulations further
clarify that transgender “means having a gender identity or gender
expression that differs from societal expectations based on gender
102
assigned at birth.”
The relevant rule from the Colorado Code of Regulations
provides: “All covered entities shall allow individuals the use of
gender-segregated facilities that are consistent with their gender
identity. Gender-segregated facilities include, but are not limited
103
to, restrooms, locker rooms, dressing rooms, and dormitories.”
Similar to the plaintiff’s argument in Goins, TLDEF argued
that denying Coy access to the bathroom that corresponded to her
gender identity was inherently stigmatizing, and would lead to Coy

98. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601(2) (West, Westlaw through May 2,
2014).
99. Id. § 24-34-601(1).
100. Recognizing that educational institutions are places of public
accommodation under Colorado Revised Statutes section 24-34-601(1), many
Colorado school districts have already implemented policies supportive of
transgender students. See, e.g., BOULDER VALLEY SCH. DIST., GUIDELINES REGARDING
THE SUPPORT OF STUDENTS WHO ARE TRANSGENDER AND GENDER NONCONFORMING 3
(2013) (“Students shall have access to the restroom that corresponds to their
gender identity consistently asserted at school. Any student who is transgender and
who has a need or desire for increased privacy, regardless of the underlying
reason, should be provided access to a single stall restroom, but no student shall
be required to use such a restroom.”).
101. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-301(7) (Westlaw). (‘“Sexual orientation’
means a person’s orientation toward heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality,
or transgender status or another person’s perception thereof.”).
102. 3 COLO. CODE REGS. § 708-1:81.2(B) (2014).
103. Id. § 708-1:81.11(B).
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104

being singled out, harassed, and even bullied. The Colorado Civil
Rights Division found that the school’s refusal to allow Coy use of
the girls’ restroom created “an environment rife with harassment
105
and inapposite to a nurturing school atmosphere” and concluded
that “telling [Coy] that she must disregard her identity while
performing one of the most essential human functions constitutes
severe and pervasive treatment, and creates an environment that is
106
objectively and subjectively hostile, intimidating or offensive.”
C.

Identity or Biology? Doe v. Clenchy
1.

Background

Almost two years before TLDEF filed its Charge of
Discrimination against the Fountain-Fort Carson School District,
Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (GLAD), a nonprofit legal
rights organization, filed a complaint in Maine Superior Court,
“outlining counts of discrimination in education and public
accommodation, harassment, and infliction of emotional
107
distress.” The plaintiff was Nicole Maines, a fifth-grade student at
108
Asa Adams Elementary.
Like Coy, Nicole was identified as male at birth, but self109
identified as female at a very young age. Although she entered
school as a boy, by third grade Nicole was essentially living entirely
110
as a female, both at home and at school. She sang in the girls’
section of the chorus, dressed in typically “feminine” clothing and
accessories, and friends, teachers, and other students referred to

104. TLDEF Rebuttal Statement, supra note 92, at 2.
105. C.C.R.D. Determination, supra note 97, at 13.
106. Id. at 12.
107. See Doe v. Clenchy, GAY & LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS,
http://www.glad.org/work/cases/doe-v.-clenchy (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
108. Doe v. Clenchy, No. CV-09-201, slip op. at 2 (Me. Super. Ct. Nov. 20,
2012), vacated sub nom. Doe v. Reg’l Sch. Unit 26, 86 A.3d 600 (Me. 2014). In court
documents, family members are not named but referred to as the Does, with the
transgender student referred to by the pseudonym “Susan Doe.” News stories,
however, identified the plaintiff as Nicole Maines, now fifteen. Since this note
directs readers to sources outside of court documents, I refer to the plaintiff by
her given name for consistency’s sake.
109. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment
at 2–3, Doe, No. CV-09-201.
110. Id. at 3.
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111

her by female pronouns. Beginning in third grade, and with the
agreement and support of school staff, Nicole used the girls’
restroom at school without incident, and continued to do so
112
throughout her fourth-grade year. She continued using the girls’
restroom at the start of her fifth-grade year until, on September 28,
a male student followed her into the restroom, evidently on the
instruction of his grandfather, who objected to Nicole’s use of the
113
girls’ restroom. A second, similar incident took place when the
same student again violated the school’s anti-harassment policy by
114
disrupting Nicole’s use of the girls’ restroom on October 3.
Rather than address the violation of the anti-harassment policy, the
school abruptly terminated Nicole’s use of the girls’ restroom and
115
required that she use a separate staff-only restroom.
In April of 2008, and again in November of 2009, Nicole’s
mother filed a complaint with the Maine Human Rights
Commission (MHRC) alleging violations of the Maine Human
116
Rights Act (MHRA). Both times, the Commission unanimously
found reasonable grounds to believe that Superintendent Kelly
Clenchy, the Orono School Department, and School Union
Number 87 had engaged in “unlawful education and public
accommodation discrimination” when they denied Nicole access
117
and use of the girls’ restroom facilities.
In May of 2011, GLAD filed a complaint in Maine Superior
Court on behalf of the Maines family and the MHRC, outlining
118
several counts of discrimination and harassment. The following
November, the trial court judge granted summary judgment for the
defendants, finding that denying Nicole access to the girls’
119
restroom did not violate the state’s anitdiscrimination law. GLAD
immediately appealed the decision, and on June 12, 2013, the case
120
was argued before the Maine Supreme Court.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 6.
114. Id. at 2, 6.
115. Id. at 6–7.
116. Amended Complaint at 5–6, Doe v. Clenchy, No. CV-09-201, (Me. Super.
Ct. Nov. 20, 2012).
117. Id. at 5.
118. See id. at 4–6.
119. Doe, No. CV-09-201, slip op. at 25.
120. Press Release, GLAD, GLAD Argues Transgender Girl’s Case Before
Maine High Court (June 12, 2013), http://www.glad.org/current/press-release
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Superior Court Decision

The MHRA declares that it is the policy of the state to “prevent
discrimination in . . . access to public accommodations . . . and . . .
education on account of sex, sexual orientation or physical or
121
mental disability.” The term “sexual orientation” is defined in the
MHRA as “a person’s actual or perceived heterosexuality,
122
bisexuality, homosexuality or gender identity or expression.”
Justice William Anderson, writing for the superior court, found
that, based on the plain meaning of section 4591(1) of the Maine
Revised Statutes, “it is unlawful to separate or segregate persons in
restroom usage by sex or sexual orientation in a school” and that
“there is no question that as a transgender student, the [MHRA]
123
protects [Nicole].” However, Justice Anderson determined that,
lacking direction from the Maine Supreme Court on the subject,
the standard to be applied in a case of alleged discrimination in an
educational setting was the “deliberate indifference standard”
124
developed under Title IX, which requires a showing of deliberate
125
126
indifference to known harassment. In contrast, the Title VII
discrimination standard requires only a showing that the
harassment is known or should be known and that there has been a
127
failure to take appropriate remedial action. Justice Anderson
found that the deliberate indifference standard of Title IX had not

/glad-argues-transgender-girls-case-before-maine-high-court.
121. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4552 (West, Westlaw through 2013 2d Reg.
Sess.); see also id. § 4602(4)(A) (prohibiting discrimination in education on the
basis of sexual orientation); id. § 4592(1) (prohibiting denial of public
accommodations on the basis of sexual orientation).
122. Id. § 4553(9-C).
123. Doe, No. CV-09-201, slip op. at 9–10.
124. Id. at 21–23. Title IX states in part, “No person in the United States shall,
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
125. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 641–43 (1999);
Santiago v. Puerto Rico, 655 F.3d 61, 73 (1st Cir. 2011).
126. Title VII states in part, “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a).
127. See, e.g., Espinal v. Nat’l Grid NE Holdings 2, L.L.C., 693 F.3d 31, 36 (1st
Cir. 2012); Wilson v. Moulison N. Corp., 639 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2011).
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128

been met. The trial court additionally found that the defendants
129
had acted within the law under MHRC Rule 4.13 and title 20-A,
130
section 6501 of the Maine Revised Statutes, which work together
to permit schools to separate restroom usage by sex. Relying in part
131
on the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Goins, Justice
Anderson concluded that there was a distinction between sexual
orientation discrimination—which is prohibited by both Maine and
Minnesota’s Human Rights Acts—and permissible sex segregation
132
as it relates to restroom usage. The court pointed out that the
Goins decision, along with a New York case that adopted the Goins
133
rationale, supported its reasoning, as both the Minnesota and
New York courts held that their states’ human rights laws restricting
restroom usage on the basis of biological sex did not violate
134
transgender individuals’ rights under those laws. The superior
court additionally found that, regardless of Nicole’s irrefutable
status as someone protected by the Maine Human Rights Act, “sex”
in the context of Rule 4.13 meant solely biological sex, and did not
135
include sexual orientation or gender identity.

128. Doe, No. CV-09-201, slip op. at 22–23.
129. “An educational institution may provide separate toilet, locker room, and
shower facilities on the basis of sex, but such facilities provided for students of one
sex shall be comparable to such facilities provided for students of the other sex.”
94-348-4 ME. CODE R. § 4.13 (West, Westlaw through Apr. 15, 2014).
130. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 6501(1)(B) (West, Westlaw through 2013
2d Reg. Sess.) (“A school administrative unit shall provide clean toilets in all
school buildings, which shall be . . . [s]eparated according to sex and accessible
only by separate entrances and exits[.]”). Without such statutes and regulations,
the general establishing of boys’ and girls’ restrooms, showers, or locker rooms in
a public school would constitute unlawful discrimination because establishing such
facilities requires de facto sex segregation.
131. Goins v. W. Grp., 635 N.W. 2d 717 (Minn. 2001).
132. Doe, No. CV-09-201, slip op. at 13–15.
133. Hispanic Aids Forum v. Estate of Bruno, 792 N.Y.S.2d 43, 47 (App. Div.
2005) (holding that a lease provision requiring that the tenant not allow
transgender persons to use the restroom corresponding with their gender identity
was not discriminatory, but rather an inherently acceptable practice of designation
of restroom used based on biological sex).
134. Doe, No. CV-09-201, slip op. at 13–14.
135. Id. at 16.
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136

A “Momentous Decision” —Victory at the Supreme Court

The MHRC, which joined the Maines family as plaintiffs in the
lawsuit, argued that the superior court had seriously misinterpreted
137
Rule 4.13. In its brief, the MHRC pointed out that it had adopted
Rule 4.13 in 1984, long before gender identity was added to the
138
MHRA as a protected class, and argued that it was an error for
the superior court to rely on the dictionary definition in defining
139
“sex” as “biological sex.” The Commission advocated for an
interpretation of “sex” that reconciled Rule 4.13, section 6501(1),
and the MHRA, while simultaneously remaining consistent with the
140
nondiscriminatory purpose of the MHRA as a whole. Although
the Commission’s interpretation of Rule 4.13 is not conclusive,
both Maine and federal law advocate deference to the statutory
141
interpretation of the administering agency.
On January 30, 2014, the Maine Supreme Court overturned
the decision of the superior court, marking the first time a state
court has ruled that transgender students must be allowed to use
142
bathrooms that match their gender identity. The court’s carefully
worded majority opinion focused on students’ educational needs as
136. In a press release following the Supreme Court’s decision, GLAD
attorney Jennifer Levi stated, “This is a momentous decision that marks a huge
breakthrough for transgender young people . . . . Schools have a responsibility to
create a learning environment that meets and balances the needs of all kids and
allows every student to succeed.” Press Release, Gay & Lesbian Advocates &
Defenders, GLAD Celebrates Breakthrough Ruling in Favor of Transgender
Student (Jan. 30, 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted), http://www
.glad.org/current/press-release/glad-celebrates-breakthrough-ruling-in-favor-of
-transgender-student.
137. Brief of Appellant Maine Human Rights Commission at 20, Doe v. Reg’l
Sch. Unit 26, 86 A.3d 600 (Me. 2014) (No. Pen–12–582), 2013 WL 8351143.
138. Id.
139. Id.; see Doe, No. CV-09-201, slip op. at 16.
140. Brief of Appellant Maine Human Rights Commission, supra note 137,
at 27–28.
141. See Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 397 (2008) (“Just as we
defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretations of the statute when it issues
regulations in the first instance, the agency is entitled to further deference when it
adopts a reasonable interpretation of regulations it has put in force.” (internal
citations omitted)); Mar. Energy v. Fund Ins. Review Bd., 767 A.2d 812, 814
(“When the dispute involves an agency’s interpretation of a statute administered
by it, the agency’s interpretation, although not conclusive, is entitled to great
deference . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
142. See Doe, 86 A.3d at 607.
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well as antidiscrimination laws, and emphasized the weight given to
the “accepted and respected diagnosis that [is] present in this
143
case.”
Our opinion must not be read to require schools to
permit students casual access to any bathroom of their
choice. Decisions about how to address students’
legitimate gender identity issues are not to be taken
lightly. Where, as here, it has been clearly established that
a student’s psychological well-being and educational
success depend upon being permitted to use the
communal bathroom consistent with her gender identity,
denying access to the appropriate bathroom constitutes
sexual orientation discrimination in violation of the
144
MHRA.
The court’s decision relied heavily on issues of statutory
construction, closely echoing the arguments made by the MHRC:
Seemingly contradictory provisions should not be viewed
as irreconcilable when they serve different purposes . . . .
. . . When one construction would lead to a result that
is inimical to the public interest, and a different
construction would avoid that result, the latter
construction is to be favored unless the terms of the
145
statute absolutely forbid it.
The court found that “the sole purpose of the publicaccommodations and educational-opportunities provisions of the
MHRA is to ensure equal enjoyment of and access to educational
opportunities and public accommodations and facilities,” and
noted that “[t]he public-accommodations and educationalopportunities provisions were amended in 2005 to prohibit
146
In
discrimination against transgender students in schools.”
contrast, the chapter containing section 6501 of the Maine Revised
Statutes had not been amended since 1983, and the court noted
that the purpose of that section was to “establish cleanliness and
maintenance requirements for school bathrooms, as well as
147
requirements for the physical layout of toilet facilities.”

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. (referring to Nicole’s diagnosis of gender dysphoria).
Id.
Id. at 604–05.
Id. at 605 (footnote omitted).
Id.
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Because these statutes serve different purposes, they
are not irreconcilable . . . . Although school buildings
must, pursuant to section 6501, contain separate
bathrooms for each sex, section 6501 does not—and
school officials cannot—dictate the use of the bathrooms
in a way that discriminates against students in violation of
148
the MHRA.
149
The MHRA prohibits discrimination (including segregation )
on the basis of sexual orientation, both in regard to public
150
accommodation and education. The term “sexual orientation” is
defined to include “a person’s actual or perceived . . . gender
151
identity or expression,” and the MHRC’s employment regulations
define the term “gender identity” as “an individual’s gender-related
identity, whether or not that identity is different from that
148. Id. at 606. Regarding Rule 4.13, the court noted:
This regulation simply confirms that schools may provide separate
bathrooms in compliance with 20-A M.R.S. § 6501 (2013) and
emphasizes that neither sex may be given preferential treatment. Like
section 6501, however, it predates by more than twenty years the
inclusion of sexual orientation in the MHRA. It offers no guidance
concerning use of sex-separated facilities by transgender students, and
is therefore of minimal relevance to the present analysis.
Id. at 606 n.9.
149. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(2) (West, Westlaw through 2013 2d
Reg. Sess.) (‘“Discriminate’ includes, without limitation, segregate or separate.”).
150. The Act proscribes unlawful public accommodations discrimination, in
relevant part, as follows:
It is unlawful public accommodations discrimination, in violation of
this Act: For any [covered entity] . . . to directly or indirectly refuse,
discriminate against or in any manner withhold from or deny the full
and equal enjoyment to any person, on account of . . . sexual
orientation . . . any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities,
goods, services or privileges of public accommodation, or in any
manner discriminate against any person in the . . . terms or conditions
upon which access to accommodation, advantages, facilities, goods,
services and privileges may depend.
Id. § 4592(1). The Act proscribes unlawful education discrimination, in relevant
part, as follows:
It is unlawful education discrimination in violation of this Act, on the
basis of sexual orientation, to: . . . Exclude a person from participation
in, deny a person the benefits of or subject a person to discrimination
in any academic, extracurricular . . . or any other program or activity.
Id. § 4602.
151. Id. § 4553(9-C).
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traditionally associated with that individual’s assigned sex at birth,
including, but not limited to, a gender identity that is
152
transgender.” Based on the above, the Maine Supreme Court
found that the school district’s refusal to grant Nicole access to the
girls’ bathrooms constituted sexual orientation discrimination in
violation of the MHRA and, accordingly, vacated the judgment of
153
the superior court.
VI. IDENTITY AS THE DETERMINING FACTOR: A CALL FOR CHANGE
A.

Identity over Biology

The Clenchy decision gave the Maine Supreme Court the
opportunity to recognize the legislature’s intent to support the
state’s LGBT students and protect their ability to be safe and
participate equally in school programs and activities. Particularly
for adolescents, school is the primary social setting of a student’s
day-to-day existence, and their psychosocial development “is
centrally connected to the quality of the social interactions that
154
take place within the school setting.” As one author has noted,
Children spend the majority of their waking hours in
school. Over the years they spend significantly more time
with their classmates and teachers than they do with their
parents. A child’s experience at school can significantly
enhance or undermine their sense of self. Furthermore,
children need to feel emotionally safe in order to learn
155
effectively.
Singling out trans* students by requiring them to use separate
bathrooms from other students precludes them from the
socialization and bonding that takes place in these settings. It
disrupts their ability to develop normal peer relationships, while
marginalizing and isolating them. Students, especially adolescents,
are well attuned to messages of difference and exclusion.
Teenagers are often hyper-conscious of ways in which their bodies

152. 94-348-3 ME. CODE R. § 3.02(C)(2) (West, Westlaw through Apr. 15,
2014).
153. Doe, 86 A.3d at 607.
154. Deana F. Morrow, Social Work Practice with Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and
Transgender Adolescents, 85 FAM. SOC’Y 91, 93 (2004).
155. STEPHANIE A. BRILL & RACHEL PEPPER, THE TRANSGENDER CHILD: A
HANDBOOK FOR FAMILIES AND PROFESSIONALS 153 (2008).
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156

differ from others around them, and requiring trans* students to
use a separate bathroom sends a clear message that the school, and
the accompanying teachers, peers, administrators, and officials,
think of those students as not really the gender they identify as, but
as something ‘other.’ As U.S. District Judge Donovan Frank noted,
The teenage years are a time of discovery as all of our
youth assert their individuality and sexuality. Those
students who identify themselves as gay, lesbian, bisexual,
or transgender . . . struggle with the added pressures of
potential alienation from friends, family, and community,
and the potential for ridicule or even violence . . . .
Schools, in particular, are vital environments that can
provide an education of both the substance of diversity
and the responsible manner with which such diversity is
157
approached and expressed.
The disparate treatment of transgender youth under schools’ sexsegregated facilities policies is part of a larger problem of
harassment and discrimination in schools, and the time has come
for schools to step up and take responsibility by addressing the ways
in which their policies allow and even encourage discrimination.
B.

Moving Forward: Suggestions for a More Equal Future
1.

GLSEN and the Model District Policy

Founded in 1990 by a group of public school teachers, the
Gay, Lesbian & Straight Education Network (GLSEN) has grown
into the leading national organization focused on ensuring safe
158
GLSEN provides resources and
schools for all children.
workshops for schools and teachers on how to support LGBT
students, supports youth-led diversity education efforts in schools
and communities, and conducts research on the experiences and

156. See, e.g., AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, DEVELOPING ADOLESCENTS: A
REFERENCE FOR PROFESSIONALS 8 (2002) (“[T]his is a period in which physical
appearance commonly assumes paramount importance.”).
157. Chambers v. Babbitt, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1073 (D. Minn. 2001)
(holding that the prohibition of a “Straight Pride” shirt worn by a high school
student was unconstitutional because “[m]aintaining a school community of
tolerance includes the tolerance of such viewpoints”).
158. Who We Are: Improving Education, Creating a Better World, GAY, LESBIAN &
STRAIGHT EDUC. NETWORK, http://glsen.org/learn/about-glsen (last visited Apr.
14, 2014).
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159

needs of LGBT students in K–12 settings. In 2013, GLSEN, in
partnership with the National Center for Transgender Equality
(NCTE), released the Model District Policy on Transgender and
160
Gender Nonconforming Students. The Model Policy “outlines
best practices for schools to ensure that all students are safe,
included and respected in school, regardless of their gender
identity or expression” and presents policy objectives and
alternative options in a format intended to be easily adaptable to fit
individual schools’ needs, “while keeping the original intent of the
161
The Model Policy addresses privacy and
policy intact.”
162
163
identity documents,
bullying and
confidentiality issues,
164
165
harassment,
student transitions,
and access to gender166
segregated activities and spaces, among other topics. Regarding
access to gender-segregated facilities such as restrooms, locker
rooms, and changing facilities, the Model Policy specifies that
students shall have access to facilities that correspond to
their gender identity . . . . [R]equiring a transgender or
gender nonconforming student to use a separate,
nonintegrated space threatens to publicly identify and
marginalize the student as transgender and should not be
done unless requested by a student. Under no
circumstances may students be required to use sexsegregated facilities that are inconsistent with their
167
gender identity.
168
169
170
California,
Colorado,
MassaSchools in Connecticut,
171
172
173
chusetts, and Washington, as well as Toronto, have adopted
159.
160.

Id.
GAY, LESBIAN & STRAIGHT EDUC. NETWORK & NAT’L CENTER FOR
TRANSGENDER EQUAL., MODEL DISTRICT POLICY ON TRANSGENDER AND GENDER
NONCONFORMING STUDENTS (2013).
161. Id. at 1.
162. Id. at 4.
163. Id. at 2.
164. Id. at 3.
165. Id. at 8.
166. Id. at 6–7.
167. Id.
168. See CONN. SAFE SCH. COAL., GUIDELINES FOR CONNECTICUT SCHOOLS TO
COMPLY WITH GENDER IDENTITY AND EXPRESSION NON‐DISCRIMINATION LAWS 7–8
(2012) (discussing gender identity or expression as prohibited grounds for
discrimination, and asserting the right of students to use restrooms and locker
rooms corresponding with their gender identity).
169. See L.A. UNIFIED SCH. DIST., TRANSGENDER AND GENDER VARIANT
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policies similar to the Model Policy, recognizing the right of
students to use restrooms that correspond with their gender
identity. However, these schools are still the minority, and while
each school district’s independent recognition of the importance
and validity of a student’s gender identity is a step in the right
direction, it is a slow march toward equality that leaves countless
transgender youth unprotected at a national level.
2.

A Matter for Congress?

On March 14, 2013, California Representative Linda Sánchez
174
introduced the Safe Schools Improvement Act of 2013. If passed,
the Act would require schools receiving federal funding to
implement policies to ban bullying, including bullying on the basis
175
of sexual orientation and gender identity. Just over a month later,
Colorado Representative Jared Polis introduced the Student NonDiscrimination Act of 2013, which prohibits public school students
from being excluded from participating in, or being subject to
STUDENTS—ENSURING EQUITY AND NONDISCRIMINATION, REF‐1557.1, at 5 (2011),
(“[S]tudents shall have access to the restroom that corresponds to their gender
identity asserted at school”).
170. See BOULDER VALLEY SCH. DIST., supra note 100.
171. See MASS. DEPT. OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUC., GUIDANCE FOR
MASSACHUSETTS PUBLIC SCHOOLS CREATING A SAFE AND SUPPORTIVE SCHOOL
ENVIRONMENT: NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF GENDER IDENTITY (2013)
(“[T]he principal should be clear with the student (and parent) that the student
may access the restroom, locker room, and changing facility that corresponds to
the student’s gender identity . . . . Transgender students who are uncomfortable
using a sex-segregated restroom should be provided with a safe and adequate
alternative.”).
172. See RANDY I. DORN, PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATION IN WASHINGTON PUBLIC
SCHOOLS: GUIDELINES FOR SCHOOL DISTRICTS TO IMPLEMENT CHAPTERS 28A.640 AND
28A.642 RCW AND CHAPTER 392-190 WAC, at 30 (2012) (“School districts should
allow students to use the restroom that is consistent with their gender identity
consistently asserted at school.”).
173. See TORONTO DIST. SCH. BOARD, TDSB GUIDELINES FOR THE
ACCOMMODATION OF TRANSGENDER AND GENDER NON‐CONFORMING STUDENTS AND
STAFF 7 (2011) (“All students have a right to safe restroom facilities and the right
to use a washroom that best corresponds to the student’s gender identity,
regardless of the student’s sex assigned at birth. Requiring students to ‘prove’
their gender (by requiring a doctor’s letter, identity documents, etc.) is not
acceptable. A student’s self‐identification is the sole measure of the student’s
gender.”).
174. Safe Schools Improvement Act of 2013, H.R. 1199, 113th Cong. (2013).
175. Id. § 3.
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discrimination under, any federally-assisted educational program
on the basis of their actual or perceived sexual orientation or
176
gender identity. Whereas the Safe Schools Improvement Act
requires primary and secondary schools to take a proactive role in
preventing harassment and discrimination by adopting and
177
enforcing antibullying policies, the Student Non-Discrimination
Act establishes the legal rights of victims of bullying and delineates
the federal government’s response to schools condoning LGBT
178
As of February 2014, both bills have been
discrimination.
referred to the House Subcommittee on Early Childhood,
Elementary, and Secondary Education, and neither is expected to
179
make it past the committee or to be enacted. While both bills, if
enacted, would mean greater protection for LGBT students in
public schools, neither addresses the question of restroom access
based on gender identity.
3.

A State-by-State Solution: California’s School Success and
Opportunity Act

In August 2013, California Governor Jerry Brown signed into
law an amendment to California Education Code section 221.5,
which, as it previously existed, prohibited public schools from
discriminating on the basis of specified characteristics, including
gender, gender identity, and gender expression, and specifies
various statements of legislative intent and the policies of the state
180
in that regard. Assembly Bill (AB) 1266, known as the School
Success and Opportunity Act, added a single sentence to the code:
“A pupil shall be permitted to participate in sex-segregated school
programs and activities, including athletic teams and competitions,
and use facilities consistent with his or her gender identity, irrespective of

176. Student Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, H.R. 1652, 113th Cong. (2013).
177. H.R. 1199 § 3.
178. H.R. 1652.
179. Overview of H.R. 1199: Safe Schools Improvement Act of 2013, GOVTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr1199 (last visited Apr. 14, 2014);
Overview of H.R. 1652: Student Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, GOVTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr1652 (last visited Apr. 14, 2014).
180. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 221.5 (West, Westlaw through ch. 15 of 2014 Reg.
Sess.); see also Victory! CA Bill Will Ensure the Success and Well-Being of Transgender
Students, TRANSGENDER L. CENTER, http://transgenderlawcenter.org/archives/3544
(last visited Apr. 14, 2014) [hereinafter Victory!].
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181

the gender listed on the pupil’s records.” The Act went into effect on
January 1, 2014, and, despite efforts by conservative organizations
such as National Organization for Marriage and Privacy for All
Students, a referendum seeking to repeal the Act did not qualify
182
for the November 2014 ballot.
The impact of the Act was apparent even before it was signed
into law. Just three weeks after the California Senate approved the
183
bill by a vote of 21–9, the U.S. Department of Justice, joined by
the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights,
announced a settlement agreement with the Arcadia Unified
School District in Arcadia, California, to resolve an investigation
184
into allegations of discrimination against a transgender student.
The complaint alleged that the district had denied the student
educational opportunities on the basis of sex when it prohibited
him from accessing facilities consistent with his male gender
identity, including restrooms and locker rooms at school, as well as
prohibiting him access to sex-specific, overnight accommodations
185
during a school-sponsored, academic trip. School board officials
unanimously approved the agreement, under which the school will:
[1] work with a consultant to support and assist the
district in creating a safe, nondiscriminatory learning
environment for students who are transgender or do not

181. School Success and Opportunity Act, 2013 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 85 (West)
(codified at Cal. Educ. Code § 221.5 (Westlaw)) (emphasis added).
182. The referendum effort fell 17,276 signatures short of the 504,760 needed
to qualify for the ballot. See Melanie Mason, Measure to Block Transgender Student
Law Fails to Make Ballot, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2014, 5:58 PM), http://www.latimes
.com/local/political/la-me-pc-transgender-student-initiative-20140224,0,68994
.story#ixzz2uSggdPc0. See generally Students and Families Optimistic That School Success
and Opportunity Act (AB1266) Will Remain Law, LGBTWEEKLY (Jan. 8, 2014),
http://lgbtweekly.com/2014/01/08/students-and-families-optimistic-that-school
-success-and-opportunity-act-ab1266-will-remain-law/ (discussing the first count
vote from January 2014).
183. Don Thompson, Transgender Bathroom Rights Bill Passed by California
Lawmakers, HUFFINGTON POST (July 3, 2013, 9:01 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/2013/07/03/transgender-bathroom-rights_n_3543601.html.
184. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Reaches Agreement with
Arcadia, Cal., Sch. Dist. to Resolve Sex Discrimination Allegations (July 24, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/July/13-crt-838.html.
185. Id.; see also Resolution Agreement, Arcadia Unified Sch. Dist.-U.S. Dep’t
of Educ., Office for Civil Rights-U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., July 24,
2013, OCR No. 09-12-1020, DOJ No. 169-12C-70 [hereinafter Arcadia Resolution
Agreement].
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conform to gender stereotypes; [2] amend its policies and
procedures to reflect that gender-based discrimination,
including discrimination based on a student’s gender
identity, transgender status, and nonconformity with
gender stereotypes, is a form of discrimination based on
sex; and [3] train administrators and faculty on
preventing gender-based discrimination and creating a
nondiscriminatory school environment for transgender
186
students.
Although other states have adopted policies that are in line with
AB 1266, this law is the first of its kind in the country, ensuring that
public schools statewide will respect students’ gender identity and
making sure that students can fully participate in all school
activities, sports teams, programs, and facilities that match their
187
gender identity.
V. CONCLUSION
The promise of an equal education opportunity for
transgender students can be fulfilled only if the students are able to
fully live as the gender they are. When a school denies a
transgender student access to the restroom that matches his or her
gender identity, the school is denying a critical part of that
student’s sense of self and exposing the student to rejection and
discrimination. The impact to trans* students—who identify as one
gender, are recognized by classmates and family members as that
gender, and then are told by a school or court that they cannot use
the corresponding restroom—is one with life-long repercussions.
Courts are slowly but surely recognizing that there is no clear,
settled definition of the term “sex” and that the criteria used in
188
determining sex are expansive and evolving.
186. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 184; see also Arcadia
Resolution Agreement, supra note 185.
187. Victory!, supra note 180.
188. Thirty years ago, in his opinion finding that Karen Ulane had been the
victim of sexual discrimination, Judge John Grady observed:
Prior to my participation in this case, I would have had no doubt
that the question of sex was a very straightforward matter of whether
you are male or female. That there could be any doubt about that
question had simply never occurred to me . . . . After listening to
the evidence in this case, it is clear to me that there is no settled
definition . . . as to what we mean by sex.
Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 821, 823 (N.D. Ill. 1983), rev’d, 742
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In its determination that Colorado state law requires schools to
recognize students’ gender identity, the Colorado Human Rights
Commission acknowledged the impact and necessity of a
nondiscriminatory policy in the school setting:
The [school] perceives that as long as the [student] has
access to a restroom, it is satisfying its obligation to
provide services to the [student]. This perception is
reminiscent of the “separate but equal” philosophy, which
revealed, at least in terms of protected classes, that
separate is very rarely, if ever, equal. School is not merely
an institution for educating children through books and
structured classes. It provides children with a platform
that enables them to self-actualize into productive
individuals. Children also learn social skills, such as
respect, communication, trust, how to appropriately
interact with people from different backgrounds, and how
to become part of a community. Thus, a very important
component of school is being accepted by one’s peers. It
enhances one’s ability to learn and develop a healthy ego,
189
which in turn ensures a positive educational experience.
When trans* students are marginalized by schools and courts, there
is a significant risk of the student internalizing the categorization of
“other.” As the Colorado Civil Rights Division noted, the school
years are a time for youth to develop healthy egos and a sense of
190
belonging to a community. For transgender youth specifically,
“there is the additional challenge of integrating a complex gender
identity with their cultural and ethnic backgrounds, personal
191
Supported and
characteristics, and family circumstances.”
empowered transgender youth will have a direct impact on the
overwhelmingly disproportionate rates of homelessness, violence,
suicide, poverty, and harassment in the transgender community as
192
a whole. Ideally, the needs and rights of these students will be
recognized by the states through laws like California’s School

F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
189. C.C.R.D. Determination, supra note 97, at 13.
190. See id.
191. Arnold H. Grossman & Anthony R. D’Augelli, Transgender Youth: Invisible
and Vulnerable, 51 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 111, 113 (2006).
192. See, e.g., GRANT ET AL., supra note 24; GREYTAK ET AL., supra note 87; NAT’L
COAL. OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, supra note 19; NAT’L COAL. OF ANTI-VIOLENCE
PROGRAMS, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, QUEER AND HIV-AFFECTED HATE
VIOLENCE IN 2012 (2013); Lombardi et al., supra note 17; Stotzer, supra note 17.
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Success and Opportunity Act, or by the schools through policies
similar to GLSEN’s Model District Policy. Until then, however,
transgender students rely on courts to ensure that the promise of
an equal education opportunity is not an empty one.
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